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This paper investigates the income inequality generated by a job-
search process when di⁄erent cohorts of homogeneous workers are al-
lowed to have di⁄erent degrees of impatience. Using the fact the av-
erage wage under the invariant Markovian distribution is a decreasing
function of the discount factor (Cysne (2004, 2006)), I show that the
Lorenz curve and the between-cohort Gini coe¢ cient of income in-
equality can be easily derived in this case. An example with arbitrary
measures regarding the wage o⁄ers and the distribution of time pref-
erences among cohorts provides some insights into how much income
inequality can be generated, and into how it varies as a function of the
probability of unemployment and of the probability that the worker
does not ￿nd a job o⁄er each period.
1 Introduction
A condition for a stochastic dynamic model to be of some use in the under-
standing of income distribution is that it delivers an endogenous distribution
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1of incomes. Within this class of models, job-search models are certainly
among the simplest. In this case, the endogenous distribution is given by
the invariant distribution of wages in the economy generated by the rules
de￿ning the job search. A nice feature of studying income inequality in this
category of models is that, as we shall see, the Gini coe¢ cient of income
inequality can be parameterized in terms of some speci￿c characteristics of
the job market, such as the probability of unemployment and the probability
that an unemployed worker ￿nds no job o⁄er in a certain period.
Pissarides (1974) uses a job-search model to compare the income distri-
bution1 of two cohorts2 with di⁄erent degrees of risk aversion. This author
argues that cohorts with higher risk aversion will have a lower reservation
wage and, because the wages of employed workers will have a greater range,
the income distribution will be worse.
Pissarides does not explicit derive the stationary distribution generated by
the interactions of the transition functions implicit in his model. Moreover,
his work concentrates only on comparing (between two cohorts) within-cohort
inequalities, not formally deriving a measure of inequality among cohorts.
In this work I complement Pissaride￿ s analysis by pursuing answers to
three di⁄erent questions. First, instead of dealing with heterogenous de-
grees of risk aversion, I allow consumers in di⁄erent cohorts to have di⁄erent
discount-factor parameters. Second, in each cohort I concentrate the analysis
on the invariant Markovian distribution of all wages that a representative has
along his (supposedly in￿nite) life time. Third, I analyze inequality among
cohorts, rather than within cohorts.
The inequality among cohorts is generated by the fact that more patient
workers have higher reservation wages and higher average wages as well (see
Cysne (2004, 2006) for a demonstration of this fact).
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 is used for the presentation of
the general model, fully characterizing the job-search problem within a co-
hort. Section 3 is dedicated to the derivation of the invariant-distribution
between-cohort Gini coe¢ cient of income inequality. Section 4 is used to
make quantitative assessments of the model, based on an example with ar-
bitrary measures of the wage o⁄ers within cohorts and of the distribution of
discount factors among cohorts. Section 5 concludes.
1More rigorously, we are dealing here with wage inequality. However, transfers and
capital income usually represent only a small fraction of most households￿total income.
For the United States, for instance, following the 1992 SCF (Survey of Consumer Finances),
transfers and capital income account in average for only around 28% of the total income of
the households surveyed. This percentage tends to be even lower in developing countries.
2In this work, a cohort is de￿ned as a group of homogenous workers/consumers.
22 The Model
The basic model presented here is the same as the one presented in Cysne
(2004, 2006), which in turn draws on Stokey and Lucas￿ s (1989) version of
McCall￿ s (1970) model. The givens of the model, a partial-equilibrium one3,
are the distribution of wage o⁄ers (the same for all workers and along all
cohorts), the distribution of the discount-factor parameter among cohorts of
workers, the probability of layo⁄s and the probability that, each period, the
worker does not get any job o⁄er next period.




; B[0;1); standing for the borelians
in [0;1) and L for the Lebesgue measure, consider a continuum of cohorts, in-
dexed by j; each cohort with a large number of homogenous workers: Cohorts
di⁄er only in terms of their discount-factor parameter. The distribution of
discount factors ￿j 2 [0;1) along these cohorts is determined by:
￿j = H
￿1(j) , H
0(:) > 0 (1)
In equation (1), j has a uniform distribution in [0;1) and H stands for
a cumulative probability distribution of a random variable taking values
in [0;1):The isomorphism (1) allows us to put di⁄erent probability mea-
sures "m" in the space where the discount-factor parameters take value (also
([0;1);B[0;1))). For instance, if H is the cumulative distribution function of
a Beta (s;v) random variable, then the ￿
0
js will be distributed as a Beta
(s;v). Note that having H0(:) > 0 allows us to identify each cohort j with
its discount-factor parameter ￿j:





￿ a generic sample space and, in this measurable space, the measure q in-
duced by the wage-o⁄ers function w: ￿ ! [0;D]: In the induced space ￿
[0;D];B[0;D];q
￿
; denote by F(t) the distribution function that (q ￿ a:e: -
uniquely) determines the measure q : F(t) = p(w ￿ t):
By assumption, in each cohort, there are two states regarding the con-
sumer￿ s optimization problem: w and 0: State \w" corresponds to a job o⁄er
of w at hand, and state \0" to no job o⁄er. In state w the worker can accept
or turn down the o⁄er. If he accepts it, by assumption he stays employed
with that wage till he is laid o⁄ (which happens with probability ￿): If he
does not accept the o⁄er or if he gets no o⁄er, he remains in state 0: Being in
state zero the only thing he can do is wait again for a job o⁄er next period,
3The reader interested in a job-search model with a more general-equilibrium ￿ avour,
including endogenous creation and destruction of jobs, can refer to Mortensen and Pis-
sarides (1994).
3which happens with probability (1 ￿ ￿). The individual is not allowed to
search while in his job. The job o⁄ers are drawn from [0;D] according to the
measure q: q is known by all workers in all cohorts. Workers are not allowed
to borrow or to lend. Their consumption ct is equal to their income wt in







: From now on I will only use the index j
when necessary.
With v(w) stating for the value function, ￿ w; the reservation wage is de-
termined by (Cysne (2004, 2006)):
￿ w =
￿(1 ￿ ￿)




0 ￿ ￿ w)dF(w
0) (2)
Following the analysis in Stokey and Lucas (1989, c. 10), which displays the
particular case in which ￿ = 0; and equivalently to Cysne (2005, 2006), the
reservation wage ￿ w(j) divides [0;D] into two regions: the acceptance region
A(￿) = [￿ w(￿);D] and the non-acceptance region Ac(￿) = [0; ￿ w(￿)]: Consider
a new measure ￿t in ([0;D],B[0;D]); representing the e⁄ective wage of workers
of a certain cohort j (the j is omitted), in period t: Note that A and Ac
depend on the value of ￿.
The rules of the optimization followed by the worker de￿ne a transition
function P : [0;D] ￿ B[0;D] ! [0;1] of wage o⁄ers: If the current state (given
by the wage o⁄er) is w 2 Ac, the probability of having an o⁄er next period in
any borelian B ￿ [0;D] is given by (1￿￿)q(B)+￿, if 0 2 B; and (1￿￿)q(B)
if 0 = 2 B: Alternatively, if the current state is w 2 A; the worker can only lose
his job (with probability ￿) or keep the same wage next period. Therefore,
with probability zero he will have a wage next period in a borelian B that
does not contain either 0 or w: If the borelian B contains 0; but not w; or w
but not zero, the transition probabilities are, respectively, ￿ and 1 ￿ ￿: If it
contains both, since these are disjoint events (because 0 = 2 A), P(w;B) = 1.
A worker will be o⁄ered a wage in the acceptance region A in period t+1
if either she already had this wage in A in period t and is not laid o⁄ or
if she was unemployed, receives a wage o⁄er, and this wage o⁄er falls in A.
Formally:
￿t+1(A) = ￿t(A)(1 ￿ ￿) + ￿t(A
c)(1 ￿ ￿)q(A) (3)
Taking limits4, this leads to the following invariant measure of the acceptance
4It is easy to show that the adjoint operator (de￿ned in the linear space of signed
measures endowed with the total variation norm) de￿ned by the transition function above
has one and only one unique ￿xed point. This fact allows us to take limits in (3). This
￿xed point corresponds to the invariant measure of wage o⁄ers ￿; de￿ned in ([0;D],B[0;D]),
which is the invariant measure we are looking for.
4region A (￿ = limt!1 ￿t):
￿(A) =
(1 ￿ ￿)q(A)
￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)q(A)
(4)
Since A [ Ac = [0;D] and A \ Ac = ￿:
￿(A
c) = 1 ￿ ￿(A) =
￿
￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)q(A)
(5)
A worker will have a wage o⁄er in a set C ￿ A in data t + 1 if either she
already has a wage w 2 C and keeps it, or if she is unemployed, happens to
receive a wage o⁄er, and this wage o⁄er is in C. Formally, for C ￿ A:
￿t+1(C) = ￿t(C)(1 ￿ ￿) + ￿t(A
c)(1 ￿ ￿)q(C)
Using (4) and (5), the invariant measure of wage is now given by:
￿(C) =
(1 ￿ ￿)q(C)
￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)q(A)
(6)
The observed stationary distribution of wages in this model, ￿
￿; is a mixed
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￿
￿+(1￿￿)q(A); if S = f0g
0; if S ￿ [0; ￿ w]
(1￿￿)q(S)
￿+(1￿￿)q(A); if S ￿ A
(7)
The average wage of all workers (including employed and unemployed work-





￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)q(A(j))
(8)
where ￿ w(j) follows (2). As shown in Cysne (2004, 2006), wA is an increasing
function of the discount-factor parameter and, given (1), of j as well.
3 Income Inequality
The existence of di⁄erent discount factors between cohorts leads to a between-
cohort income inequality. The Proposition below provides an expression for
the Gini coe¢ cient as a function of the exogenous measure to be put into
the discount-factor parameters. Take a 2 [0;1):Remember, as de￿ned just
after (1), that m([0;a]) stands for the measure of cohorts with discount factor
equal or less than a:
5Proposition 1 The between-cohort Gini coe¢ cient of income inequality as-
sociated with the problem outlined above is given by:







Proof. The Lorenz curve L(j) plots the percentage of total income earned
by the economic agents of a certain cohort, when these cohorts are ordered
from those with lower average income to those with higher average income.
The Gini coe¢ cient (G) of income inequality is then, by de￿nition, given as
a function of the Lorenz curve, by




A crucial point concerning the calculation of the Gini coe¢ cient in this
model is that, as shown by Cysne (2004, 2006), there is an isomorphism
linking the average wage wA to the discount-factor parameter ￿ (because
w0
A(￿) > 0): Since (1) also de￿nes an isomorphism, between j and ￿j, there
is (by composition) an isomorphism between the measure of the population
j and the average wage wA(￿j); with w0
A(j) > 0: This fact implies that,
by ordering the population by ￿j we are, automatically, also ordering it by
income, as required in the construction of the Lorenz curve.
Keeping (1) in mind, the measure of cohorts with discount factor equal or
less than a certain constant a 2 [0;1) is given by: P(￿j ￿ a) = P(H￿1(j) ￿
a) = P(j ￿ H(a)) = H(a) = m([0;a]): This is also equivalent to the measure
of people with income less or equal than wA(￿j): The proportion of income
earned by the j% poorer workers of the cohort (the Lorenz curve), there-
fore, can be written as 1
￿ wA
R ￿j
0 wA(u)dm(u); where ￿ wA =
R 1
0 wA(u)dm(u): (9)
follows trivially from (10).
4 Quantitative Assessments
This is as far as one can go without specifying the measures q (of wage
o⁄ers) and m (of the distribution of discount factors among cohorts ). In
order to get some idea of the numbers generated by the analysis developed
here, from now on I will assume that measure q is the Lebesgue measure in
[0;1] (this measure allows for closed-form solutions to the reservation wage,
the average wage, and the Gini coe¢ cient), and that m has a density with
respect to the Lebesgue measure given by the density of a Beta (114:5;1:01)
distribution. The parameters of this distribution have been chosen in order
6to make the (monthly) average equal to 114:5=(114:5+1:01) = 0:9913; which
corresponds to an yearly average discount factor of 0:900: Some numerical
results are presented in the example below.
Example 1 This example assumes that in each period the workers face a
probability ￿ of layo⁄, a probability ￿ of not ￿nding a wage o⁄er and measures
q and m speci￿ed as above: Using (2), (8) and (9), the Gini coe¢ cient reads:
















































The values of the Gini coe¢ cients, for di⁄erent values of ￿ and ￿, are shown





Alpha 0 0:1207 0:1049
0:2 0:1224 0:1049
Note in Table 1 that the between-cohort inequality decreases when the proba-
bility of layo⁄ increases. An increase in ￿ has two e⁄ects. First, it decreases
the reservation wages of all cohorts, thereby making it more likely that low
wage o⁄ers are taken by workers in some cohorts. Second, having workers
unemployed more frequently, the average wages in all cohorts decrease, im-
poverishing all cohorts at the same time, and decreasing inequality.
The sensibility of the income distribution to the probability of not ￿nding
a job o⁄er each period, though, in the range of values of theta and alpha
in which we derived the results of Table 1, was of a di⁄erent sign and very
small.
5 Conclusions
In this paper I have investigated income inequality among cohorts of ho-
mogenous workers, when each cohort is characterized by a di⁄erent degree
5The absolute value of the numbers in Table 1, of course, vary according to how ￿ne
the numerical integration is carried out. The qualitative dependence of the Gini coe¢ cient
on the parameter values alpha and tetha, though, is not subject to this problem.
7of impatience. The work can be regarded as complementary to Pissarides￿ s
(1974), who used a job-search model to study within-cohort inequalities.
Using the result obtained by Cysne (2004, 2006), that the average wage
in each cohort based on the invariant Markov measure is a decreasing func-
tion of impatience, I have shown how to derive the Lorenz curve and the
between-cohort Gini coe¢ cient of income inequality. Next, I have provided
an example, based on arbitrary measures concerning the job o⁄ers and the
distribution of discount factors among the di⁄erent cohorts. The example
helps the to understand how the parameter values a⁄ect the Gini coe¢ cient,
and gives an idea of the amount of inequality that can be generated on ac-
count of discrepancies in discount factors among groups of workers.
The numbers obtained indicate that the degree of inequality is decreasing
in the probability of unemployment and nondecreasing in the probability that
unemployed workers in each cohort do not ￿nd job o⁄ers each period. The
probability of unemployment has shown to have a greater impact over the
generation of income inequality than the probability of ￿nding job o⁄ers.
References
[1] Cysne, Rubens Penha (2004): "A Search-Theoretic Explanation For the
Negative Correlation Between Labor Income and Impatience". Ensaio
Econ￿mico 558, EPGE/FGV.
[2] Cysne, Rubens Penha (2006): "A Search-Theoretic Explanation For the
Negative Correlation Between Labor Income and Impatience". Forthcom-
ing, Revista Brasileira de Economia. Ensaio Econ￿mico 558, EPGE/FGV.
[3] McCall, John, J. (1970): ￿Economics of Information and Job Search".
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 84: 113-126.
[4] Mortensen, Dale T., and Christopher A. Pissarides. 1994. ￿Job Creation
and Job Destruction in theTheory of Unemployment.￿Review of Eco-
nomic Studies, Vol. 61, pp. 397￿ 415.
[5] Pissarides, C. (1974): ￿Risk, Job Search, and Income Distribution". The
Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 82, No. 6. (Nov. - Dec., 1974), pp.
1255-1267.
[6] Stokey, N. L., Lucas Jr., Robert, and Edward C. Prescott (Contributor):
(1989) ￿Recursive Methods in Economic Dynamics￿ . Harvard University
Press.
8´ Ultimos Ensaios Econˆ omicos da EPGE
[586] Rubens Penha Cysne. Equity–Premium Puzzle: Evidence From Brazilian Data.
Ensaios Econˆ omicos da EPGE 586, EPGE–FGV, Abr 2005.
[587] Luiz Renato Regis de Oliveira Lima e Andrei Simonassi. Dinˆ amica N˜ ao–Linear
e Sustentabilidade da D´ ıvida P´ ublica Brasileira. Ensaios Econˆ omicos da EPGE
587, EPGE–FGV, Abr 2005.
[588] Maria Cristina Trindade Terra e Ana Lucia Vahia de Abreu. Purchasing Power
Parity: The Choice of Price Index. Ensaios Econˆ omicos da EPGE 588, EPGE–
FGV, Abr 2005.
[589] OsmaniTeixeiradeCarvalhoGuill´ en, Jo˜ aoVictorIssler, eGeorgeAthanasopou-
los. Forecasting Accuracy and Estimation Uncertainty using VAR Models with
Short– and Long–Term Economic Restrictions: A Monte–Carlo Study. Ensaios
Econˆ omicos da EPGE 589, EPGE–FGV, Abr 2005.
[590] Pedro Cavalcanti Gomes Ferreira e Samuel de Abreu Pessˆ oa. The Effects of
Longevity and Distortions on Education and Retirement. Ensaios Econˆ omicos
da EPGE 590, EPGE–FGV, Jun 2005.
[591] Fernando de Holanda Barbosa. The Contagion Effect of Public Debt on Mo-
netary Policy: The Brazilian Experience. Ensaios Econˆ omicos da EPGE 591,
EPGE–FGV, Jun 2005.
[592] Rubens Penha Cysne. An Overview of Some Historical Brazilian Macroeco-
nomic Series and Some Open Questions. Ensaios Econˆ omicos da EPGE 592,
EPGE–FGV, Jun 2005.
[593] Luiz Renato Regis de Oliveira Lima e Raquel Menezes Bezerra Sampaio. The
Asymmetric Behavior of the U.S. Public Debt.. Ensaios Econˆ omicos da EPGE
593, EPGE–FGV, Jul 2005.
[594] Pedro Cavalcanti Gomes Ferreira, Roberto de G´ oes Ellery Junior, e Victor Go-
mes. Produtividade Agregada Brasileira (1970–2000): decl´ ınio robusto e fraca
recuperac ¸˜ ao. Ensaios Econˆ omicos da EPGE 594, EPGE–FGV, Jul 2005.
[595] Carlos Eugˆ enio Ellery Lustosa da Costa e Lucas J´ over Maestri. The Interac-
tion Between Unemployment Insurance and Human Capital Policies. Ensaios
Econˆ omicos da EPGE 595, EPGE–FGV, Jul 2005.
[596] Carlos Eugˆ enio Ellery Lustosa da Costa. Yet Another Reason to Tax Goods.
Ensaios Econˆ omicos da EPGE 596, EPGE–FGV, Jul 2005.[597] MarcoAntonioCesarBonomoeMariaCristinaTrindadeTerra. SpecialInterests
and Political Business Cycles. Ensaios Econˆ omicos da EPGE 597, EPGE–FGV,
Ago 2005.
[598] Renato Galv˜ ao Flˆ ores Junior. Investimento Direto Estrangeiro no Mercosul:
Uma Vis˜ ao Geral. Ensaios Econˆ omicos da EPGE 598, EPGE–FGV, Ago 2005.
[599] Aloisio Pessoa de Ara´ ujo e Bruno Funchal. Past and Future of the Bankruptcy
Law in Brazil and Latin America. Ensaios Econˆ omicos da EPGE 599, EPGE–
FGV, Ago 2005.
[600] Marco Antonio Cesar Bonomo e Carlos Carvalho. Imperfectly Credible Disin-
ﬂation under Endogenous Time–Dependent Pricing. Ensaios Econˆ omicos da
EPGE 600, EPGE–FGV, Ago 2005.
[601] Pedro Cavalcanti Gomes Ferreira. Sobre a Inexistente Relac ¸˜ ao entre Pol´ ıtica
Industrial e Com´ ercio Exterior. Ensaios Econˆ omicos da EPGE 601, EPGE–
FGV, Set 2005.
[602] Luiz Renato Regis de Oliveira Lima, Raquel Sampaio, e Wagner Gaglianone.
Limite de Endividamento e Sustentabilidade Fiscal no Brasil: Uma abordagem
via modelo Quant´ ılico Auto–Regressivo (QAR). Ensaios Econˆ omicos da EPGE
602, EPGE–FGV, Out 2005.
[603] Ricardo de Oliveira Cavalcanti e Ed Nosal. Some Beneﬁts of Cyclical Monetary
Policy. Ensaios Econˆ omicos da EPGE 603, EPGE–FGV, Out 2005.
[604] Pedro Cavalcanti Gomes Ferreira e Leandro Gonc ¸alves do Nascimento. Welfare
and Growth Effects of Alternative Fiscal Rules for Infrastructure Investment in
Brazil. Ensaios Econˆ omicos da EPGE 604, EPGE–FGV, Nov 2005.
[605] Jo˜ ao Victor Issler, Afonso Arinos de Mello Franco, e Osmani Teixeira de Carva-
lho Guill´ en. The Welfare Cost of Macroeconomic Uncertainty in the Post–War
Period. Ensaios Econˆ omicos da EPGE 605, EPGE–FGV, Dez 2005.
[606] Marcelo Cˆ ortes Neri, Luisa Carvalhaes, e Alessandra Pieroni. Inclus˜ ao Digital
e Redistribuic ¸˜ ao Privada. Ensaios Econˆ omicos da EPGE 606, EPGE–FGV, Dez
2005.
[607] Marcelo Cˆ ortes Neri e Rodrigo Leandro de Moura. La institucionalidad del
salario m´ ınimo en Brasil. Ensaios Econˆ omicos da EPGE 607, EPGE–FGV, Dez
2005.
[608] Marcelo Cˆ ortes Neri e Andr´ e Luiz Medrado. Experimentando Microcr´ edito:
Uma An´ alise do Impacto do CrediAMIGO sobre Acesso a Cr´ edito. Ensaios
Econˆ omicos da EPGE 608, EPGE–FGV, Dez 2005.
[609] Samuel de Abreu Pessˆ oa. Perspectivas de Crescimento no Longo Prazo para o
Brasil: Quest˜ oes em Aberto. Ensaios Econˆ omicos da EPGE 609, EPGE–FGV,
Jan 2006.[610] Renato Galv˜ ao Flˆ ores Junior e Masakazu Watanuki. Integration Options for
Mercosul – An Investigation Using the AMIDA Model. Ensaios Econˆ omicos da
EPGE 610, EPGE–FGV, Jan 2006.